Research Area:  Edge Computing

Abstract:

Driven by pervasive mobile devices and ubiquitous wireless communication networks, mobile cloud computing emerges as an appealing paradigm to accommodate demands for running power-hungry or computation-intensive applications over resource-constrained mobile devices. Cloudlets that move available resources closer to the network edge offer a promising architecture to support real-time applications, such as online gaming and speech recognition. To stimulate service provisioning by cloudlets, it is essential to design an incentive mechanism that charges mobile devices and rewards cloudlets. Although auction has been considered as a promising form for incentive, it is challenging to design an auction mechanism that holds certain desirable properties for the cloudlet scenario. In this paper, we propose an incentive-compatible auction mechanism (ICAM) for the resource trading between the mobile devices as service users (buyers) and cloudlets as service providers (sellers). ICAM can effectively allocate cloudlets to satisfy the service demands of mobile devices and determine the pricing. Both the theoretical analysis and the numerical results show that the ICAM guarantees desired properties with respect to individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness (incentive compatibility) for both the buyers and the sellers, and computational efficiency.

Keywords:  

Author(s) Name:  A-Long Jin; Wei Song and Weihua Zhuang

Publisher name:  IEEE

DOI:  10.1109/TETC.2015.2487865

Volume Information:  Volume: 6, Issue: 1, Jan.-March 2018,Page(s): 45 - 57

Paper Link:   https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7296648